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I INTRODUCTION 
If there was ever a time to suggest the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(Bill of Rights) is a "horse with no teeth" ' , now is the time. 
P v D finally determines the existence and scope of a new common law tort 
which has the practical effect of abrogating the Bill of Rights guarantee to freedom of 
expression.
2 Despite this, the Bill of Rights is disposed of in one sentence and a "dead 
American horse"
3 is imported into our common law at the expense of our constitutional 
guarantee. 
Due to ongoing uncertainty regarding privacy issues and without the benefit of a 
crystal ball , many issues arising in P v D are unable to be resolved with any certainty, 
but it is conclusive that where previous courts expressed and exhibited caution m 
developing the tort, Nicholson J threw caution to the wind, and in his "rush"
4 to 
establish a tort of privacy neglected to complete a full legal analysis of the issues. 
P v D is a judgment which shows "contempt for the right of freedom of 
expression",5 cutting across the established balance between freedom of expression and 
protection of reputation". 
6 
1 submit that because Nicholson J did not undertake a full legal analysis of the 
issues arising in P v lJ the judgment is automatically questionable. 
2 
3 
4 
6 
Marilyn Ireland "Liberties Under Threat" in ewspaper Publishers Association and 
Commonwealth Press Union Privacy. A Need.for Balance. (Newspaper Publishers Association 
of New ZeaJand Inc. (NPA) and CommonweaJth Press Union (New ZeaJand Section) (CPU), 
l 997) 6. 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act l 990, s 14 . 
Ireland, above n l , 9. · 
William Akel "The Rush to Privacy" [2000] NZLJ 263, 263 
Jock Anderson " ew Ruling threatens free speech" The ational Business Review, 24 March 
2000, 1. 
Akel above n4, 266. 
5 
II BACKGROUND TO P v D 
A Facts 
In early 1999 the defendant (D), a journalist, was asked by the second 
defendant, Independent News Auckland Limited ("Independent News"), which 
publishes the ' Sunday Times ' weekly newspaper, to prepare a profile on the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff (P) is a "public figure"
7 as a consequence of activities and publicity 
relating to P ' s occupation. 
D was aware of the public activities of P and had access to a previously 
published article on P. He deposed that as part of his general knowledge he was aware 
of suggestions that P had suffered from a psychological/psychiatric problem. He also 
deposed that while others were aware of this suggestion, it had never been verified nor 
been published in any previous profiles on P. D spoke to a number of people regarding 
P, but few people would go on record with their comments. He contacted P ' s office to 
attempt to arrange an interview with P. D was told an interview could be arranged 
subject to numerous conditions including a guarantee that P would see a draft of the 
article before it was published and could make any deletions or alterations P wanted.
8 
D could not comply. 
ln the course of research D was told the name of a psychiatric hospital at which 
P had been treated and the name of a Policeman who may have come to P' s aid in an 
emergency situation. D deposed that the source has had no contractual or occupational 
relationship with P. 
7 
8 
P 1• D (25 February 2000) unreported , High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 126/99, 2. 
P 1• D above n7, 2. 
6 
D contacted the named policeman who would not discuss or even confirm
 the 
supposed emergency. 
D asked a member of P' s occupational group about possible "upheavals"
9 in P' s 
life. That person replied 
10 
that he was aware of where D was going but he would not go 
anywhere down that path. 
D posted a letter to P declining P' s terms for an interview but offerin
g an 
opportunity to discuss the topic and "how [he had] apparently overcome t
hese matters 
to be the ... of the high standing that [he is]. " 
11 
The matter did not advance further and D did not see completion as 
being 
possible unless he spoke with P directly. A draft was prepared, but it w
as not in a 
publishable form . 
On 25 March 1999 P ' s solicitors faxed the editor of Sunday Star Times a
sking 
for confirmation that information "which would amount to a gross
 breach of 
confidentiality and a serious damage of P ' s privacy"
12 would not be published. They 
stated their intention to seek an interim injunction preventing publication t
he following 
day. They filed an ex parte application for an interim injunction that next d
ay and upon 
the defendants undertaking not to publish without notice, the proce
edings were 
adjourned with restricted file access orders. 
9 
10 
II 
12 
P 1• D above n7, 3. 
P 1• D above n7 , 3. 
P 1• D above n7. 
P ,, D above n7. 
7 
B Claim and Defence 
P alleged that the information that a police officer came to P' s aid in a m
edical 
emergency and that P had been treated at the unnamed psychiatric hospit
al could only 
have been obtained by a breach of confidentiality. P also claimed that p
ublication of 
the information would infringe P' s right to privacy. As a result, P wa
s seeking an 
interim injunction prohibiting the defendants from printing, publishing o
r distributing 
the information until further order of the court. P also sought a decla
ration by the 
defendants that publication would be a breach of confidentiality and/o
r breach of a 
right to privacy, and that the identity of P and the contents of the Cou
rt file not be 
disclosed until further orders of the court. 
The defendants submitted there was no actual information beyond sugge
stions 
and no real evidence that publication was likely (and that in fact the evide
nce there was 
established the contrary). The defendants also argued that there were 
a number of 
factors persuasive against the exercise of the court ' s discretion to grant a
n injunction, 
including the effect of section 14 of the Bill of Rights and the und
esirability of 
imposing prior restraint in the absence of reliable evidence of a breach
 of a clearly 
defined obligation or the right of another. 
III FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
A Background 
Freedom of expression appears in the European Convention on Human R
ights 
(article 10) and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rig
hts (ICCPR) 
(article 19(2)) which was signed by New Zealand in 1968, ratified 10 ye
ars later and 
affinned in the Short Title of the Bill of Rights. 
It now appears in section 14 of the Bill of Rights which reads 
8 
"14. Freedom of Expression - Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information and opinions of any kind in any form. " 
This section was recently described by the New Zealand Court of Appeal as 
being "as wide as human thought and imagination" . 
13 
Long recognised as "one of humankind' s most precious rights", 
14 and "of 
fundamental importance in our society", 
15 the Supreme Court of Canada has stated the 
purpose of the freedom as being 
16 
.. to ensure that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, 
indeed all expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or 
contrary to the mainstream. 
Its justifications are persuasive on both an individual and societal level. As an 
individual , restraint on the ability to express oneself is an affront to human dignity, 
while on a social level , a society which is knowledgable is more adaptable and thus 
more stable. Also, as members of a society we need to know facts about our society 
and the way we are governed in order to exercise our rights in a democracy.
17 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Moonen I' Film and Literature Board ~f Review (17 December 1999) unreported, Court of 
Appeal, CA 42 I 99, 9. 
John Burrows "Freedom of the Press under the New ZeaJand Bill of Rights Act 1990" 
in Phillip Joseph ( ed) Essays 011 the Constitutio11 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995), 286. 
Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd [ 1981] 2 WLR 848, 865 per Lord Denning 
Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Procurer General) (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 577, 606 per 
Dickson CJC, Lamer and Wilson JJ. 
Burrows, above nl4, 286 These concepts were also identified and accepted as the 
purposes of the right in the White Paper commentary of s 14. (Hon. Geoffrey Palmer (Minister o
f 
Justice) A Bill of Rights/or New Zealand A White Paper. (PD Hasselberg Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1985) 79). 
9 
The incorporation of the freedom of expression in statutory form arguably 
promises greater protection for freedom of the press. 
18 Although it is not explicit, as it 
is in other jurisdictions for example Canada, section 14 impliedly includes freedom of 
the press. This was expressly recognised by Thomas J when he stated that section 14 
19 
... provides a right for the news media to publish information and a 
right for the public to receive that information . ... Occasional 
shortcomings in practice do not impair the right itself and by and large 
are to be accepted in the interests of securing a free and vigorous 
press. 
B The Applicability of the Bill of Rights to the Development and Application of 
the Tort of Privacy 
Section 3 of the Bill of Rights establishes those parties to whom the Act 
applies. 1t states 
3. Application - This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done -
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government 
of New Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function, 
power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or 
pursuant to law. 
As the first tort action developed in the glare of the Act since its enactment 
there is little guidance as to the extent of the Act's influence in that process. Further it 
IR 
19 
Burrows, above n 14, 286 
Police 1• 0 'Connor [1992] l NZLR 87, 97-99 per Thomas J. Expressly stated to apply to 
newspapers, television and radio in the White Paper commentary of s 14. (Hon. Geoffrey Palmer 
(Minister of Justice) A Bill of Rights.for New Zealand. A White Paper. (PD Hasselberg 
Government Printer, Wellington 1985) para 10.55 -10.57, 80). 
10 
is questionable whether it is relevant to the application of the tort in situations like P v 
D where the parties are private individuals, prima facie outside the public law sphere 
which the Bill of Rights governs. Invariably privacy issues will arise from the actions 
of a media organisation in relation to a private individual. While it is generally 
established that certain media institutions and certain actions of those institutions are 
considered acts in the performance of a public function pursuant to s3(b),
20 it is not 
always the case.2' 
Following Dolphin Delivery (Retail, Wholesale & Department Stores Union) v 
Dolphin Delivery Ltd,
22 in which the Canadian Supreme Court held that the term 
"government" did not refer to the judiciary for the purposes of the Charter, (the 
implication being that the Canadian Charter does not apply to private law litigation), 
New Zealand academics advocated for the same approach to be adopted here .23 The 
Canadian approach, and the suggestion that New Zealand adopt it, has been criticised,
24 
the criticism itself gaining judicial support.
25 This is due to the substantive contextual 
differences in the relevant application provisions of the Charter and our Bill , and in 
light of the approach taken in other comparable jurisdictions.
26 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
For example, in TI'3 Network Ltd v Eveready New Zealand Ltd [l 993] 2 NZLR 435 (CA) 
Cooke P expressed the view that although TV3 is a privately-owned company, as a licensed 
television broadcaster it exercises broadcasting functions pursuant to duties required by s4 
Broadcasting Act l 989. 
For example, in Television New Zealand Ltd v News Monitor Services Ltd [1994] 2 ZLR 91 
(HC) in which he concluded that the purely private trading functions of a body (for example, 
recording video copies of television broadcasts) although empowered by statute, such as a state-
owned enterprise, are not subject to the Bill of Rights Act. 
Dolphin Delivery (Retail, Wholesale & Department Stores Union) v Dolphin Delive,y 
Ltd ( 1986) 33 DLR ( 4th) 176. 
Paul Rishworth "The Potential of the New Zealand Bill of Rights" [1990] NZLJ 68 ; David 
Paciocco "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Curial Cures for a Debilitated Bill" [ 1990] 
NZ Recent LR 353 . 
Andrew Butler "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and private common law litigation" [ 199 11] 
NZLJ 261 . 
Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidaled Press NZ Ltd [1997] NZLR 22 (HC) per 
Elias J. 
With regards to the textual differences, the Canadian Charter in its equivalent section, s32, 
applies its provisions to the Parliament and government of Canada and to the legislature and 
government of each province. Unlike s3(a) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights, it contains no 
11 
Section 3(a) of the Bill of Rights states that the provisions of the legislation 
apply to acts done by the judicial branch of the government, that is the courts. 
Because "the exposition of the common law is a paradigmatically judicial act", the 
common law is then a "conscious and deliberate act of the judicial branch of the 
government of New Zealand".
27 As such, the entire corpus of the common law is 
caught by s3(a) of the Bill of Rights.
28 
Although it has not been finall y determined, I submit that the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights Act apply to the acts of the judiciary in developing and applying the 
common law even in cases of private litigation because 
ultimately it is the public element of the judicial function which makes 
all common law litigation subject to the Bill of Rights, not the public or 
private identity of the parties to the litigation. 
29 
Therefore, a decision neglecting to give full weight to Bill of Rights 
considerations is itself in violation of the Act. 
27 
28 
29 
mention of the judiciary. New Zealand ' s Bill of Rights explicitly states that acts of the judiciary 
are caught by its provisions. Further, comparing the approach taken in the United States and 
Irish jurisdictions, it was recognised that even in the absence of a provision similar to s3 the 
courts are accepted to be part of the government of the state. Case law from these jurisdictions 
illustrate an explicit acceptance that application of the common law in private litigation is a 
governmental function . (Approach taken by Butler, above n24.) "The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
and private common law litigation" [1991] NZLJ 261 ). 
Butler, above n24, 261. 
Butler, above n24, 261 . 
Butler, above n24, 263 . 
12 
IV FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TORT 
OF PRIVACY IN NEW ZEALAND 
A The Status of Privacy in New Zealand Prior to P v D 
Privacy and people's right to it has been protected by New Zealand's 
obligations at international law since 1978
30 but it is not specifically protected by the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights. However, the Bill of Rights does, in its Long Title, affirm 
its commitment to its international obligations as contained in the ICCPR. Article 17 
of the ICCPR states 
Article 17 (1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy,
31 family, home or 
correspondence nor to unlawful attacks on his honour 
and reputation; 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks. 
In Australia (where there is no independent right to privacy) Kirby P has considered 
privacy interests to be relevant where there are ambiguities in the law by virtue of 
Australia's ratification of the ICCPR and Article 17 within it. 
32 Such an approach is 
consistent with New Zealand's position on privacy and is equally applicable here . 
The New Zealand courts have also recognised a privacy interest in s21 of the 
Bill of Rights, (the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure), which 
has been said to "reflect an amalgam of values: property, personal freedom, privacy 
and dignity."33 However, this is more akin to a property right and does not protect 
privacy invasions arising from the unwanted public disclosure of private facts. Section 
30 
31 
32 
New Zealand ratified the ICCPR (Article 17 of which protects privacy) in 1978. 
Emphasis added. 
Carrol v Attomey-Ge11eral for NSW (October 1993) unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 21. 
13 
28 of the Bill of Rights means that the partial incorporation of a right in the Act does 
not destroy any wider ambit that a right might otherwise have. This allows for the 
existence of the latter type of privacy right in other legislation or common law. 
However, it has been absent from New Zealand common law until recently, 
which is in line with other Commonwealth jurisdictions, most notably England
34 and 
Australia35 . Other common law causes of action
36 have gone some way towards 
protecting privacy interests but are unable to protect specific privacy invasions, for 
example the publication of private, true facts. 
37 
The legislature has implemented limited protectional provisions for example, s4 
of the Broadcasting Act 1989 which states 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
4. Responsibility of broadcasters for programme standards - (1) 
Every broadcaster is responsible for maintaining in its programmes and 
their presentation, standards which are consistent with -
R JJ A [1994] I NZLR 429, 433 per Richardson J (emphasis added) 
"This case highlights, yet again, the failure of both the common law of England and statute to 
protect in an effective way the personal privacy of individual citizens" Kaye v Roberston ( 1990) 
IPR 14 7, 154 per Lord Justice Bingham There is still currently no common law right to privacy 
in England, but this may soon change because England has incorporated its international 
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 8 protecting respect for 
private life) into the Human Rights Act 1998 coming into effect in October 2000 . 
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Ettingshausen ( 1991) 23 NSWLR 443 in which a rugby 
league player brought an action in defamation for the publication of a photo of him naked in a 
shower. No privacy action was pursued but Kirby P expressed the view that no such action 
existed in Australia. 
For example: Trespass TT '3 Network Services Ltd,, Broadcasting Standards Authority [ 1995] 2 
NZLR 720; Lincoln Hunt v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457 . Breach of Confidence Attorney-
General (UK) ,, Guardian Newspapers Ltd [ 1988] 1 NZLR 129 (CA); Hellewe/1 v Chief 
Constable of Derbyshire [1995] I WLR 804; [ 1995] 4 All ER 473 . Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress Stephenson ,, Basham [ 1992] NZLR 225 ; Tucker ,, News Media Ownership 
[1986] 2 NZLR 716. 
Defamation protects unwanted disclosure of facts about a person which will effect the 
reputation of that person, but truth is an absolute defence to a defamation action in ew 
Zealand, so if the facts are true they are likely to be published as the law stands in New Zealand . 
14 
(c) The privacy of the individual; ... 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) provides guidelines to 
broadcasters in the form of seven privacy principles which have been affirmed, on 
review, by the High Court. While this provision pertains only to broadcasting, it will 
have implications for print media as BSA decisions will become relevant in the 
evolution of the privacy tort
38
. For example, a decision of the authority was referred to 
in the Bradley case, and Eichelbaum CJ in the High Court approved the authority' s 
approach39. In P v D the latter case assisted in Nicholson J's assessment of the status 
and ambit of the privacy tort as it existed in New Zealand. The print media, through 
the Press Council, have strengthened its own procedures to go some way towards 
meeting requirements of the Privacy Act which illustrates a general awareness of 
privacy issues. 
A more specific piece of privacy legislation is the Privacy Act 1993. The Act 
applies to personal information
40 and covers both public and private bodies. However, 
the Act does not apply to the media in relation to gathering, preparing, and 
disseminating news, observations on news, or current affairs
4 1
. This distinction was 
argued for by the Privacy Commissioner who recognised that the media could not 
function without it. 
42 It has been suggested that the Privacy Act has no impact on the 
media at all 43 and this appears to be the courts ' view also.
44 
38 
39 
40 
4 1 
42 
43 
44 
John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (4ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1999) 178 . 
7'V3 Network Services Ltd" Broadcasting Standards A111horily (1995] 2 NZLR 720; (1995) l 
HRNZ 558, on appeal from Mrs S BSA 1/94 . 
"Personal Information" is information about any live person who is identifiable - L " N Decision 
11 /97. 
Privacy Act 1993, s2 - "Agency" and "News activity". 
Burrows and Cheer, above n38, 189. 
Burrows and Cheer, above n38, 190. 
C ,, TI '3 Ne/work Sen•ices Ltd BSA Decision 39-40/98 
15 
Over a period of around fifteen years the New Zealand Courts have been 
developing and considering the existence and scope of a privacy tort. Full judicial 
consideration and analysis has been slow probably because previous cases ra1smg 
privacy issues have been interlocutory and because claims based on the tort are being 
4-
settled out of court. ) Also, probably because they have involved the pleading of 
multiple causes of action 4
6
. 
B Judicial Preference for Established Torts 
Prior to P v D the Courts noticeably preferred providing a remedy pursuant to a 
pre-existing cause of action (where possible), rather than demonstrate a firm 
commitment to a tort of privacy by finding on the basis of it.
47 As a result, cases 
raising privacy issues involve multiple alternative causes of action in order to increase 
the likelihood of success. 
In P v D the plaintiff also pleaded breach of confidence. This tort is well 
established in New Zealand common law.
48 In his analysis of the tort Nicholson J 
adopted the three-pronged approach stated by Megarry J (as he then was) in Coco v AN 
Clark (Engineers) Ltd.
49 He took the traditional approach to the relationship 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Burrows and Cheer, above n38 , 178. 
For example in Tucker v News Media Ownership [ 1986] 2 NZLR 716 the plaintiff pleaded two 
causes of action. The first was based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and the second was based on the tort of invasion of privacy as it was constituted in the USA at 
that time. In Bradley v Wing1111t Films Ltd [ 1993] 1 ZLR 415 the plaintiff pleaded five causes 
of action namely Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Privacy, Malicious Falsehood, 
Trespass and Defamation. 
A I' Television New Zealand Ltd (25 March 1996) unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, 
CP 55/96 where in a similar factual situation as in Tucker v News Media Ownership [1986] 2 
NZLR 716 Doogue J issued an injunction preventing the publication of the plaintiff's name on 
the basis of "overall justice". 
AB Consolidated Lid I' Europe Strength Food Co Pty Ltd [ 1978] 2 NZLR 515. 
That first , the information itself must have the necessary quality of confidence about it . Second, 
that the information be imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. Third, 
that there is an unauthorised use of the information to the detriment of the party who originally 
communicated it Coco I' AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [ 1969] RPC 41 , 4 7. 
16 
requirement, considering it to be the essence of the cause of action, when judicial 
trends indicate a relaxation of this requirement. It has been suggested that in 
appropriate cases where the information is, by its nature, obviously private and 
confidential it alone may be sufficient even in the absence of a relationship.so Medical 
information arguably inherently confidential information. While there is no common 
law privilege covering communications between doctor and patient, New Zealand has 
adopted a position whereby medical practitioners are accorded a limited statutory 
privilege.s 1 The medical information regarding P' s mental well being is arguably 
analogous to information accorded this privilege. Therefore, it was open to Nicholson 
J to follow recent trends and allow the injunction on the basis of the tort of breach of 
confidence. Instead, "P's confidentiality argument failed and the privacy punch 
connected". 52 
Finding on the basis of pre-existing torts where possible accords with the 
courts ' express caution in developing and applying a tort of privacy in New Zealand. 
Nicholson J threw caution to the wind in his obvious willingness to assess the tort 's 
position in New Zealand common law, but, respectfully, did so without full legal 
analysis. 
50 
51 
52 
Stephen Todd ( ed) The Law of Torls in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, Wellington, 1997) 961 . 
For example Lord Goff used the example of an obviously confidential document being blown 
out an office window onto a street where a passer-by happened upon it; A-G v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No2) [1990] I AC 109,281 ; [1988] 3 All ER 545, 658-659. This approach 
was also taken in a later (again English) case in which it was suggested that the disclosure of a 
photograph of a person engaged in a private act, taken with a telephoto lens, would amount to a 
breach of confidence; He/lewe/1 v Chief Constable o_f Derbyshire [1995] I WLR 804, 807; 
[1995] 4 All ER 473 , 476 per Laws J. 
Recognised by Beattie J in McD011gall v Henderson [ 1976] l ZLR 59 referring to Evidence 
Act 1908 s 8 then in force, now Evidence Amendment Act 1980 s 32 . 
Anderson, above n4, I . 
J 
17 
C The Evolution of the New Zealand Tort of Privacy 
In Tucker v Ne ws Media Ownership Ltd, the first case in which privacy was 
considered by the New Zealand courts, McGechan J agreed with statements made by 
Jeffries J in earlier injunction proceedings, that .. "the right to privacy ... may provide 
the plaintiff with a valid cause of action in this country". 
53 However, he makes it clear 
that his support is given with "caution and hesitation"
54 warning that privacy may in 
fact not amount to an " independent right capable of protection by tort action, it is 
certainly a factor which can be taken into account where appropriate by a Court 
exercising such a judicial duty as determination of overall justice"
55
. 
In the other reported New Zealand case, Bradley v Wingnut Films, Gallen J was 
prepared to accept "that such a cause of action forms part of the law of this country" 
which is particularly significant given the proceedings in the case were final and not 
interlocutory. However, the case was not determined on the basis of the tort and Gallen 
J reiterated " its extent should be regarded with caution".
56 
Two unreported interlocutory proceedings are also relevant to the evolutionary 
process of the tort. Following an acknowledgment of the comments of McGechan J in 
the Tucker case supporting the introduction of a privacy tort, Holland J expressed his 
view that public interest may in some cases exceed that of privacy of the individual. 
57 
Two years later, Williams J granted an interim injunction on the basis of the Tucker 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
Tucker 1• News Media Ownership [ 1986) 2 NZLR 71 6, 73 2. 
7i,cker 1• News Media Ownership above n53 , 733 . 
Tucker v News Media Ownership above n53 , 735. 
Bradley 1• Wingn11t Films [1993] 1 NZLR 415, 423. 
Morgan I ' Television New Zealand Limited (1 March 1990) unreported, High Court , 
Christchurch Registry, CP 67/90, 6. 
18 
case, preserving the position where application for name suppression is likely under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985.58 
D The Constitution of the New Zealand Tort of Privacy 
P v D has finally confirmed privacy' s existence and determined, to a degree, 
the ambit of the tort. Nicholson J accepted the elements propounded by the American 
jurist William L Prosser, and applied by the American courts, as pertaining to the 
public disclosure of private facts . 
First, there must be a public disclosure of facts . Second, the facts disclosed 
must be private facts . And third, the matter made public must be one which would be 
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 59 
There is a degree of ambiguity as to the requirements of this third element. On 
its construction it is difficult to determine whether the facts themselves must be 
' offensive and objectionable ' or whether it is the disclosure of those facts which must 
be of that nature. Prosser himself associated the requirement with a "mores" test, by 
which liability follows from "publicity of those things which the customs and ordinary 
views of the community will not tolerate".60 This suggests the facts themselves need to 
be offensive. An assessment of the application of the requirement in American 
jurisprudence does little to resolve the ambiguity. In Barber v Time 
6 1 the Supreme 
Court of Missouri suggested liability accrues where the limits of decency are exceeded. 
58 
59 
60 
6 1 
C 1• Wilson and Horton Ltd (27 May 1992) unreported, High Court , Auckland Registry, SP 
765/92 . 
William L Prosser "Privacy" (1960) 48 Cal L Rev 383 . 
Prosser, above n59, 397. 
Barber v Time Inc (1 942) 159 SW 2d 29 1. 
19 
62 
These limits are exceeded where intimate details of the life of one who 
has never manifested a desire to have publicity are exposed to the 
public ... 
This suggests liability where publication is offensive. However, comments in Sidis v 
F-R Pub. Corporation63 suggest that both the nature of the facts and publication must 
be offensive. 64 
Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the 
victim 's position as to outrage the community' s notions of decency. 
In New Zealand, privacy principles based on the American tort of privacy are 
applied by the Broadcasting Standards Authority and have had judicial endorsement.
65 
They require the facts themselves to be highly offensive and objectionable to a 
reasonable person. 
With no discussion of the ambiguity Nicholson J applies the element on the 
basis that publication of the information is offensive in the circumstances, satisfying 
the tort and finding there to be a breach of privacy. 
E The Role of Public Interest in the Tort of Privacy 
Nicholson J established the New Zealand tort of privacy to encompass the three 
factors discussed above as propounded by Prosser, and adopted by Gallen J in the 
Bradley case, but added a fourth factor involving an assessment of the "nature and 
extent of legitimate public interest in having the information disclosed".
66 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
Barber v Time Inc above n6 l , 293 
Sidis ,, F-R Puh. Corporation ( 1940) l l 3 F 2d 806. 
Sidis v F-R Pub. Corporation, above n63 , 809 . 
n '3 Network Services Ltd" Broadcasting Standards Authority above n39 . 
Much like truth is a defence to a defamation action in New Zealand. 
20 
The public interest is often an integral consideration when balancing the 
enforcement of tort law with censorship issues.
67 It is established that "there is a wide 
difference between what is interesting to the public and what is in the public interest to 
make known".68 This distinction is alluded to by Nicholson through his language, 
accepting only "legitimate"69
 public interest as being worthy of overriding other 
competing values. It has also been accepted that "newsworthiness" does not equate 
with ' public interest' as the media are "vulnerable to the error of confusing the public 
interest with their own interest" .
70 Others hold the alternative view that the press has a 
legitimate role in determining what the public interest is
7 1
, and that it should definitely 
not be defined by the courts. The courts are certainly not strangers to determining 
whether despite being information obtained by unlawful behaviour it should be 
published the courts must weigh "the public interest for and against publication. "
72 
Due to the cursory assessment of the public interest in P v D it is unclear 
exactly what type of enquiry Nicholson J envisaged when incorporating the factor into 
the requirements of the tort. 
67 
68 
69 
70 
7 1 
72 
For example, Breach of Confidence (Lio11 laboratories Ltd v Evans [ 1985] l QB 526 (CA); 
Defamation (Australian C onso/idated Press Ltd v Ettingsha11sen ( 199 l) 23 NSWLR 443 ); 
Trespass (TV3 Network Sen,ices v Broadcasti11g Standards Authority above n39) . 
British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [ 1981] AC 1096, 1168 per Lord 
Wilberforce. 
P v D above n7. 
Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [ 1984] 1 WLR 892, 898 per Sir John 
Donaldson MR. 
The view of Grant Huscroft, Constitutional and Human Rights law specialist and Senior Law 
Lecturer at Auckland University expressed in Anderson, above n4, 7; Also, a radio authority has 
defined the public interest issue in this way, " ews is about things that have some significance to 
listeners, so if a thing is truly private, it ' s not news" in Al Morrison "Privacy: What About Public 
Good?" in Newspaper Publishers Association and Commonwealth Press Union Privacy. A 
Need for Balance. (Newspaper Publishers Association of ew Zealand Inc (NP A) and 
Commonwealth Press Union (New Zealand Section) (CPU), 1997) 25 . 
British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [ 1981] AC 1096, 1202 per Lord 
Fraser. 
./ 
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In the Tucker case issues of public interest were raised, but as an element of the 
process in which detriment to the plaintiff was balanced against freedom of expression. 
In Morgan v Television New Zealand
73 the court described the public interest as a 
" limitation"74 on a right to privacy. In TV3 Network Services Ltd v Fahe/
5 the Court 
of Appeal considered the public interest an integral aspect of the balancing of 
competing values, notably freedom of expression and pnvacy. This was also the 
approach taken by Robertson J in Beckett v TV3 Network Services Ltd 
76 when 
weighing the same competing values. 
This type of balancing exercise by the courts, has been coloured by rules 
governing the prior restraint of media which have evolved in the common law over a 
hundred years. Nicholson J ignored this tradition, resulting in a judgment which "cuts 
across the established balance between freedom of expression and protection of 
· ,, 77 reputation . 
F Public Interest and the Prior Restraint of Freedom of Expression 
For a hundred years courts commonwealth jurisdictions have applied common 
law rules governing prior restraint of the media. The rules reflect the recognition by 
the courts of the importance of freedom of expression and also illustrate the caution 
exercised in providing a remedy censoring issues of legitimate public interest. These 
rules were expressly anticipated by the drafters of the Act as limits on freedom of 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
Morga11 ,, Televisio11 New Zealand Limited above n57. 
Morgan v Televisio11 New Zea/a11d limited above n57, 6 per Holland J. 
n '3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey [ 1999] 2 NZLR 129 
Beckett v TV3 Network Services Ltd ( 18 April 2000) unreported, High Court, Whangarei 
Registry, CP 10/00. 
Akel, above n3 , 266. 
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expression 78 and were applied by the Court of Appeal recently when balancing 
competing rights, one being freedom of expression. 
79 
As long ago as 1891 the English Court of Appeal warned that it was necessary 
for the court to exhibit 
exceptional caution in exercising the jurisdiction to interfere by 
injunction .. leaving free speech unfettered .. 
80 
This approach is arguably more applicable today as a result of the statutory 
guarantee of free expression in the Bill of Rights. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal applied this approach as recently as 1998 in 
a judgment in which Richardson P stated that "any prior restraint of free expression 
requires passing a much higher threshold than the arguable case standard",
81 adding 
that" .. it is a jurisdiction exercised only for clear and compelling reasons." 
82 
In fact, the High Court has followed such principles in a judgment subsequent 
to P v D stating 83 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
The Court for good reasons of policy and principle have been most 
cautious in all cases which seek prior restraint. ... high standards .. 
must necessarily be demanded, before the Court will act as a censor on 
legitimate public debate and interest about an issue of serious concern. 
"The freedom .. is obviously subject to important limits imposed by the law .. the various means 
of limitation [include] censorship in advance, .. injunctive relief in advance ... Those laws 
anticipate a threat to some other interest (such as in personal reputation), and control speech for 
that reason " Hon. Geoffrey Palmer (Minister of Justice) A Bill of Rights for New Zealand. A 
White Paper. (PD Hasselberg Government Printer, Wellington 1985)79-80 
n '3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey above n75 . 
Bo1111ard1•Perryma11 [1891] 2 Ch 269, 284 (CA?). 
71 '3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey above n75, 132 . 
TV3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey above n75 , 136. 
Beckett ,, 7Y3 Network Service Ltd above n76, 9 per Robertson J. 
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Nicholson J ignored this common law tradition without justification, again 
failing to develop the tort and its remedies in light of the specific New Zealand 
common law context, itself developed to accommodate the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression. 
G Public Interest and Protection of Reputation in Defamation Proceedings 
Because a pnvacy claim (alleging public disclosure of private facts ) will 
invariably be brought in order to protect a subject's reputation in society it is relevant 
to compare the courts ' approach to public interest considerations in defamation 
proceedings, an action brought to protect the same interests. 
New Zealand has adopted a specific position with regards to defending 
injunction proceedings aimed at restraining the publication of facts arising from 
defamation proceedings. If a proposition is true, then it is not subject to any 
requirement that it be in the public interest as well. 
84 This position recognises that "a 
person is entitled only to the reputation his or her behaviour deserves",
85 and is an 
approach is favoured by the Court of Appeal because of its apparent consistency with 
s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act. 
86 It would be anomalous to require different things of a 
defendant in a privacy action where that defendant is also defending the right to publish 
true facts. An early The Court of Appeal only a year prior to P v D , in a judgment 
delivered by Richardson P, stated 
87 
84 
85 
86 
87 
While the question of .. invasion of privacy is analytically a separate 
issue, it is, in substance, very much bound up with the question of truth . 
Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd [ 1997] 3 NZLR 590. 
Todd (ed), above nSO, 907. 
Lange v Atkinson above n25 , 436 . 
TT '3 Network Serl'ices Ltd 1· Fahey above n75, 136. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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If [the publisher] establishes the truth of what is to be published .. in 
such circumstances, damages would clearly be an adequate remedy. 
Nicholson J did not consider particular aspects of the privacy tort in light of 
their New Zealand context which reflects a recognition of freedom of expression, 
favouring a direct adoption of the elements from the American model. 
H The American Model - the Status of the Tort and the Impact of Public 
Interest 
Nicholson J ' s direct adoption of the American model of the tort is questionable, 
particularly in light of the status of the tort in America today. Unrecognised by Nichols 
J, the tort itself at the time of implementation was limited by the American 
constitutional right to free speech. New Zealand has imported the tort "virtually 
stripped of its free speech defence".
88 In fact, due to the First Amendment protection of 
free speech, private litigation brought as a result of the publication of private facts is, 
today, so limited by free speech concerns that it is almost totally unenforceable.
89 
While adopting an American constituted tort, Nicholson J did not follow the 
approach taken by the American courts when applying the public interest factor in P v 
D. In America there is significantly less protection of privacy of public figures . 
Legislation in some state jurisdictions affording " little protection to the privacy of 
newsworthy person whether he be such by choice or involuntarily".
90 A public figure is 
someone who by their accomplishments
91
, fame or profession have given the public a 
88 
89 
90 
9 1 
Ireland, above n2, 9. 
see Florida Star v B.J.F ( 1989) 491 US 524. Also Diane Zimmerman "Requiem for a 
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis ' s Privacy Tort" ( 1983) 68 Cornell L Rev 291 ; 
and Ireland , above n2, 9 
Time Inc, , Hill (1967) 385 US 374, 465 . 
An example of this situation is Sidis v F-R Pub. Corporation above n63 , where a famous child 
prodigy later sought to live as unobtrusively as possible but the court held there was legitimate 
25 
legitimate interest in their affairs.
92 It would seem then that applying a pure American 
approach, P would not be protected from the publication of personal details as 
Nicholson J felt he should be. 
The American approach was watered down by McGechan J in the Tucker case, 
by deciding not to place "undue weight"
93 on the fact that Mr Tucker had put himself 
in the public eye, because he was a "reluctant debutante". 
94 But he also recognised the 
need to examine the extent to which the subject had put him or herself in the public 
eye warranting "some degree of examination of his personal background and 
'worth"'95 . He stated that " [I]t may well be that a person loses a right to privacy by 
presenting himself to the public eye for evaluation"
96
. While quoting substantial 
paragraphs from the Tucker judgment Nicholson J did not discuss this aspect of it and 
did not justify his deviation from such an approach. It has been contended since the 
judgment that the subject is a legal professional
97 and the brief consideration of public 
interest issues in the judgment has been suggested to look like "the law looking after its 
own"98 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
public interest in publishing details of his lifestyle as a hermit . 
Rosemary Tobin "Invasion of Privacy" [2000] NZLJ 216, 217 . 
Tilcker v News Media Ownership above n53 , 735 per McGechan J. 
Tucker v News Media Ownership above n53 , 735 per McGechan J. 
Tucker v News Media Ownership above n53 , 735 per McGechan J. 
?iicker v News Media Ownership above n53 , 735 per McGechan J. 
Anderson, above n4, 1. 
Anderson, above n4, I . 
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V FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE APPLICATION OF THE TORT 
OF PRIVACY 
A Applicability of the Bill of Rights 
Applying common law is, as previously reasoned,
99 an act of the judicial branch 
of government pursuant to s3(a) because it is the "judicial function which makes all 
common law litigation subject to the Bill of Rights"
100 A view reflected in Thomas J's 
suggestion that the freedom both "permeates and shapes the substantive law".
10 1 
Further, in P v D section 14 was raised as a defence to the proceedings and so should 
have been given full weight and consideration in applying the tort. 
I submit that in applying the newly established tort of privacy, Nicholson J 
should have had regard to, and interpreted the elements of the tort in light of, the s 14 
guarantee of freedom of expression. 
B Application of the Elements of the Tort Established in P v D 
In P v D , Nicholson J accepted that being treated in a psychiatric hospital is a 
private fact. Also, that disclosure of this fact by the media would be a public 
disclosure. He considered the objective test less obviously satisfied. 
Context is most relevant
102 in this enqmry and despite increased public 
awareness and understanding of mental illness disabilities, Nicholson J discounts it as 
" idealistic" 103 to think that publication of such details would not be "highly offensive 
99 
100 
IOI 
102 
103 
See page 7. 
Butler, above n24, 261 . 
Police ,, 0 'Connor above n 19, 99 
Burrows and Cheer, above n38, I 76. 
P ,, D above n7, 15. 
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and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities". He felt that view 
"did not take into account actual human emotion and the value which people place on 
having intimate personal information such as their medical treatment kept private". 
104 
In a previous decision the Court took into account societal and Parliamentary views 
toward open adoption procedures in deciding that the disclosure of adoptive parents 
details to a natural mother did not constitute 'highly offensive ' in terms of the tort.
105 
At the time of the P v D judgment and before, a major Health Funding Authority 
television advertising campaign alleviated the stigma of suffering from mental illness. 
A group of high profile figures including politicians, writers, athletes and academics 
publicly declared they had suffered from a mental illness. The elements of the privacy 
tort requires a pure objective consideration of the reaction of an ordinary person of 
ordinary sensibilities (ie. someone who had never suffered a mental illness). However, 
Nicholson J imports his own subjective element into the test, requiring that ordinary 
person to be placed in the same position as the plaintiff. Even if this were correct, the 
high profile subjects of the Health Funding Authority advertising campaign indicate 
that a person in the same position as P would not perhaps be highly offended by 
publication of previous mental illness. 
Nicholson J proceeds solely on the basis of his acceptance of the contents of P' s 
affidavit in which P emotively conveys the stress and harm which would be inflicted on 
his family and the devastating effects which would impact on P, should publication 
occur. He determined publication to be highly offensive without assessing specific 
contextual factors which were relevant to the facts of the case before him. 
104 
105 
P v I) above n7, 15 . 
X 1• Attorney-Genera/ [1994] NZFLR 433 . 
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C Applying the Public Interest Element 
Application of the public interest element requires a balancing of the public 
interest associated with both of the conflicting rights. In P v D this equates to a 
balancing of the public interest in privacy with the public interest in freedom of 
expression. 
It is first necessary to determine the status of each right so as to provide a 
starting point for starting point for the balancing exercise. 
D Privacy -An Existing Right at Enactment of the Bill of Rights? 
Section 28 of the Bill of Rights Act governs the interaction between rights 
contained in the Act itself and those which exist (and did so prior to its enactment) 
independent of it. 
Section 28 states 
28. Other rights and freedoms not affected - An existing right or 
freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or restricted by reason only 
that the right or freedom is not included in this Bill of Rights or is 
included only in part. 
Its meaning is not contentious. It expresses that the Act is not an exhaustive list 
of the fundamental rights and freedoms of New Zealanders. 
106 It is particularly 
pertinent to situations where rights are in conflict and helps to determine the nature of 
the analysis which will resolve that conflict. 
106 Palmer, above n78 , para I O 179, l 12 . 
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Where rights are in conflict the courts perform a balancing exercise whereby 
the importance of each right in light of the other, and of surrounding circumstances. If 
s28 applies the balancing begins from a point whereby each right is accorded equal 
status. Where s28 does not apply the right contained in the Bill of Rights will be 
accorded greater importance in the balancing exercise than the one which does not. 
There is no indication in the judgment that Nicholson J turned his mind to s28, 
even though it has been a legitimate consideration in previous cases ( even where not 
fully examined).
107 The issues raised in P v D required Nicholson J to examine the 
applicability of this section and its implications on the balancing of privacy with the 
Bill of Rights guarantee to freedom of expression. 
E A section 28 Enquiry to Determine the Status of Privacy when Balancing 
Competing Values 
In assessing the potential implications of section 28 it is necessary to determine 
whether privacy was an existing right at the time of the enactment of the Bill of Rights 
in 1990. 
As has been established, prior to 1990 there was no established common law 
right of privacy. No cases had been finally decided on that basis and judicial dicta 
expressed caution and as to its applicability and uncertainty as to its true status in New 
Zealand as late as 1986. '
08 In 1993 the Court held the tort formed part of the law of 
New Zealand 1
09 but the case was not finally determined on that basis and there was 
107 
IOR 
109 
For example, Solicitor-General 1• Radio NZ [ 1994] 1 NZLR 48, 59; and Police JJ O '(' 011nor 
[1992] 1 NZLR 87, 98 
McGechan J expressed his uncertainty when he stated "Whether or not [privacy] is an 
independent right capable of protection by tort action, it is .. a factor which can be taken into 
account where appropriate .. " Tucker v News M edia Ow11ership Ltd above n53, 735 . 
Bradley v Wing1111/ Films [1993] 1 NZLR 415 , 423 . 
30 
lingering uncertainty as a result, until P v D. This is recognised in the White Paper 
Commentary of the Bill of Rights which states privacy to be 
110 
a right that is not by any means fully recognised .. , which is in the 
course of development, and whose boundaries would be uncertain and 
contentious. 
The Privacy Act was not enacted until 1993 and specifically protects the media, 
and the Broadcasting Act 1989 while containing a protectional provision, could not be 
considered as establishing a corresponding legal right. 
New Zealand ratified the ICCPR in 1978, Article 17 of which, as previously 
stated, 111 protects citizens from arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy 
and provides for international law protection against such interference. While of some 
legal substance domestically in that the legislature, following ratification, has a duty to 
legislate consistently with its international obligations and the ICCPR provision should 
inform the courts in their development and application of the common law, it is not 
capable of creating a right on a domestic level until incorporated into domestic 
legislation. Even the affirmation in the Long Title of the Bill of Rights does not create 
a legally enforceable right in domestic courts. 
Therefore, it is arguable that section 28 does not apply and therefore does not 
protect privacy from abrogation by the Bill of Rights guarantee. On this approach, 
privacy is accorded a lower status than freedom of expression when balancing the 
competing values. 
11 0 
111 
Palmer, above n78, para 10144, 104. 
Refer page 10. 
.; 
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While it is purely speculative how the courts will interpret such an analysis, it is 
conclusive that Nicholson J erred in not having regard to the section in the judgrnent of 
PvD. 
F Privacy as a Right Subsequent to P v D - A Further Enquiry as to Status 
By confirming that pnvacy 1s a tortious action, Nicholson J has finall y 
determined privacy to be a legal right in New Zealand. 
It remains, however, a common law right and beyond the potential for a s28 
enquiry to determine it as a subordinate right, it is arguably subservient pursuant to the 
doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy. While inconsistent legislation is protected by s4 
of the Bill of Rights, parliamentary supremacy, the "basic principle of the New Zealand 
constitutional order, requires that in the case of conflict between a statutory provision 
and a rule of the common law, the former should prevail. "
112 This would mean that 
freedom of expression would automatically trump a tortiously constituted privacy right, 
prevailing, unfettered, in circumstances such as P v D. Again, this is merely 
speculation, but is an arguable position open to Nicholson J (and future courts) in 
assessing the starting point of the balancing exercise. 
G Balancing Competing Rights - the New Zealand Context 
New Zealand courts have considered the relationship between pnvacy and 
freedom of expression and have stated 
113 
112 
.. there must, of course, be due regard for freedom of speech. However, 
freedom [ of expression] is not untrammelled. It is to be balanced against 
other rights . 
Butler, above n24, 262. 
J 
32 
This balancing exercise has been recently comprehensively formulated b
y the 
Court of Appeal in TV3 Network Services v Fahey.
114 They stated 
11 5 
The court is required to assess the context and circumstances [of the 
case], any special public interest considerations, .. and the adequacy of 
damages as an available remedy for any wrong proved at trial. 
This approach was applied where the conflicting rights were both contain
ed in 
the Bill of Rights, but, while prima facie distinguishable from P v D, the ap
proach 
taken by the Court of Appeal has obvious relevance, if only as a point 
of departure. 
However, Nicholson J did not mention the judgrnent. 
The Court of Appeal had the opportunity two months prior to the judgrnen
t of 
P v D to formulate a step-by-step approach to the assessment of the extent to w
hich, in 
that case statutory limits, can be allowed to encroach on rights contained 
in the Bill of 
Rights. 
For direct guidance regarding the balancing of common law and constitu
tional 
rights Nicholson J could have examined overseas jurisprudence. In
 Shelly v 
Kraemar 1
1 6 the American Supreme Court concluded that a Court could not enforce 
a 
restrictive covenant which otherwise met the requirements of the comm
on law, if it 
was racially motivated, and thus violating the equal protection of the Jaw 
clause of the 
14th Amendment. In Ireland the Supreme Court have often held that c
ommon Jaw 
rules which violate the guarantees of the Constitution are void and of 
no force and 
effect. The approach of both these jurisdictions illustrates the fundamen
tal principle 
113 
114 
115 
116 
Solicitor-General v Welli11gto11 Newspapers Ltd [ 1995] l NZLR 45, 57 per 
McGechan J 
TI "3 Network Services Ltd l' fahey above n75. 
n '3 Network 5,'ervices Ltd I ' Fahey above 1175, 135 . 
Shelly l' Kraemar(l 948) 334 US 1. 
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that the common law must give way to fundamental rights enshrined in a higher legal 
norm.11 7 
An obvious, and initially highly significant, difference between these two 
jurisdictions and our own is that their Constitutions are entrenched and our Bill of 
Rights is not. It is arguable, therefore, that the New Zealand position is different as 
recognised by Gault J in Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent 's Case) that' 
18 
In the absence of entrenched supreme law there is no imperative to 
accord greater status to the rights affirmed in the [Bill of Rights] Act. 
However, the approach in America and Ireland does accord with the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Supremacy, where common law must give way to the higher legal norm, 
legislation. 
H A Moonen Analysis 
Despite its "central importance in a democratic state" s 14 is "obviously subject 
to important limits imposed by the law" . 
11 9 This is the approach also preferred by the 
New Zealand courts. 120 
Only 2 months before P v D the New Zealand Court of Appeal in ajudgment
121 
delivered by Tipping J had established a comprehensive, step-by-step approach to 
11 7 
11 8 
119 
120 
12 1 
Butler, above n24, 264 . 
Simpson I' A11omey-Ge11eral (Baigen/'s Case) [ 1994] 3 ZLR 667, 712 per Gault J (dissent). 
Palmer, above n78 , 79 . 
" .. there must of course be due regard for freedom of speech. However, freedom [ of expression] 
.. is not untrammelled It is to be balanced against other rights ." Soliciror-Genera/ v Welling/011 
Newspapers Lid above nl 13 , 57 per McGechan J; " I regard freedom of speech as 
important .. but by no means the decisive element ." Tucker v New Media Ownership Ltd above 
n53 , 735 per McGechan J; "This is not a simple case where the right of freedom of 
expression and speech is clearly paramount" A I' TINZ above n47, 5 per Doogue J. 
Moonen ,. Film and Lilera/11re Board of Review above n 13 . 
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evaluating the reasonableness of an encroachment on a right contained in the Bill of 
Rights. 122 While Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review was concerned with a 
statutorily constituted limit, the Court of Appeal ' s approach is equally applicable to 
any form of encroachment, arguably including a tort. 
123 
Any tort of privacy is, after all , an abrogation of the right to freedom of 
expression . ... the extent of the abrogation must in terms of s5 of the 
Bill of Rights constitute only such reasonable limitation on freedom of 
expression as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. 
Nicholson J, again, did not mention the judgment, let alone complete the 
necessary legal analysis. I submit that the Judge was required to complete the 
appropriate legal analysis or at the very least justify his decision not to do so. 
Nicholson J's outcome is inadvertently in line with the type of outcome 
probably envisaged by the Court of Appeal in the Moonen case, in light of the minimal 
impairment requirement, in that he prevents only publication of facts about the 
subject's psychiatric treatment and mental well-being. He leaves open the possibility 
of publication of other facts about the subject and also leaves open the possibility for 
the publisher to apply to the court for revocation or amendment of the injunction order 
in the event of a "significant change of circumstances" 
124
. 
The balancing of two conflicting rights is ultimately a value judgment made by 
the Court "on behalf of the society which it serves and after considering all the issues 
122 
123 
124 
In developing the test the Court of Appeal were undoubtedly (though not expressly) influenced 
by the test expounded by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v Oakes (1986) 24 CCC (3d) 
321 ; (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200. 
Tobin, above n92, 218 . 
PI' D above n7, 18 . 
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which may have a bearing on the individual case. " 125 Whether the outcome reached by 
Nicholson J was right or wrong is arguable either way, however, it is certain that his 
approach was cursory and inexplicably vague. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The status of the tort of privacy in New Zealand was uncertain at the time of the 
P v D judgment and so Nicholson J has effectively created it and decided its ambit. He 
did so disposing of the Bill of Rights in a single sentence. 
As the first tort action developed in the glare of the Bill of Rights since its 
enactment there is little guidance as to the extent of the Act's influence in that process. 
However, section 3(a) of the Bill of rights, applying the Bill of Rights to acts of the 
judiciary, provides that the common law should be developed and applied in light of its 
provisions. The defendant raised a Bill of Rights defence, immediately pointing to the 
Act as worthy of full judicial consideration in the determination of the case. Nicholson 
J directly imported the American model of the tort of privacy, which itself possesses a 
free speech defence. In his haste to determine privacy as a common law right in New 
Zealand, he overlooked the obvious import of section 14. I submit that he erred in not 
doing so. 
The judgment overall is significantly lacking in legal analysis. Nicholson J 
failed to consider the tort ' s decaying status in America and assess the ability of one of 
its elements, and he failed to apply the public interest element in light of the approach 
taken by the American courts. He neglects to assess the tort ' s impact on long 
established common law rules of prior restraint, and fails to examine anomalies in the 
constitution of the tort in comparison with the requirements of a defamation action. 
125 Moonen 1• Film and Literature Board of Rel'iew above n 12, 11 . 
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He applied the tort without considering the impact of section 28 of the Bill of 
Rights, the implications of the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy on the status of a 
right to privacy, and recent Court of Appeal judgments providing comprehensive 
guidance as to the balancing of competing rights. 
While the outcome reached in P v D is not obviously wrong, the inadequate 
legal analysis undertaken makes the judgment of Nicholson J automatically 
questionable. 
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